Excerpts from Pentagon Building Performance Report
January 2003
1.2 STUDY TEAM The BPS team included
specialists in structural, fire, and forensic
engineering. The following six individuals
constituted the core group and are the authors
of this report:
Paul F. Mlakar, Ph.D., P.E., Lead
Technical Director
U.S.Army Corps of Engineers
Vicksburg, Mississippi
Specialty: blast-resistant design;
investigator, Murrah Federal Office Building
study
Donald O. Dusenberry, P.E.
Principal
Simpson Gumpertz & Heger, Inc.
Waltham, Massachusetts
Specialty: blast effects and structural design
James R. Harris, Ph.D., P.E.
Principal
J.R. Harris & Company
Denver, Colorado
Specialty: structural engineering
Gerald Haynes, P.E.
Fire Protection Engineer
Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco, and Firearms
Washington,D.C.
Specialty: fire protection
Long T. Phan, Ph.D., P.E.
Research Structural Engineer
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, Maryland
Specialty: concrete structural and fire engineering
Mete A. Sozen, Ph.D., S.E.
Kettelhut Distinguished Professor of Structural
Engineering
Purdue University
Lafayette, Indiana
Specialty: behavior of reinforced-concrete structures
3.2 EYEWITNESS INTERVIEWS
On January 8, 2002, BPS team leader Paul Mlakar
interviewed three eyewitnesses - two of whom
witnessed the impact of the aircraft and one of
whom witnessed the subsequent partial collapse
of the building. All three are professional
staff members of the Pentagon Renovation
Program Office and collectively provide a
coherent and credible account of the events.
Frank Probst, 58, is a West Point graduate,
decorated Vietnam veteran, and retired army
lieutenant colonel who has worked for the
Pentagon Renovation Program Office on
information management and telecommunications
since 1995. At approximately 9:30 A.M. on
September 11 he left the Wedge 1 construction
site trailer, where he had been watching live
television coverage of the second plane strike
into the World Trade Center towers. He began
walking to the Modular Office Compound, which
is located beyond the extreme north end of the
Pentagon North Parking Lot, for a meeting at 10
A.M. As he approached the heliport (figure 3.2)
he noticed a plane flying low over the Annex
and heading right for him. According to the
Arlington County after-action report (Arlington
County, 2002), this occurred at 9:38 a.m. The
aircraft pulled up, seemingly aiming for the
first floor of the building, and leveled off.
Probst hit the ground and observed the right
wing tip pass through the portable 750 kW
generator that provides backup power to Wedge
1.The right engine took out the chainlink fence
and posts surrounding the generator. The left
engine struck an external steam vault before
the fuselage entered the building. As the
fireball from the crash moved toward him,
Probst ran toward the South Parking Lot and
recalls falling down twice. Fine pieces of wing
debris floated down about him.The diesel fuel
for the portable generator ignited while he was
running. He noted only fire and smoke within
the building at the point of impact. Security
personnel herded him and others to the south,
and he did not witness the subsequent partial
collapse of the building.
Don Mason, 62, is a communications specialist
who retired from the United States Air Force
after 25 years of service. He has worked for
the Pentagon Renovation Program Office on
information management and telecommunications
since 1996. At the time of the crash he was
stopped in traffic west of the building. The
plane approached low, flying directly over him
and possibly clipping the antenna of the
vehicle immediately behind him, and struck
three light poles between him and the building.
He saw his colleague Frank Probst directly in
the plane's path, and he witnessed a small
explosion as the portable generator was struck
by the right wing.The aircraft struck the
building between the heliport fire station and
the generator, its left wing slightly lower
than its right wing.As the plane entered the
building, he recalled seeing the tail of the
plane. The fireball that erupted upon the
plane's impact rose above the structure. Mason
then noticed flames coming from the windows to
the left of the point of impact and observed
small pieces of the facade falling to the
ground. Law enforcement personnel moved Mason's
vehicle and other traffic on, and he did not
witness the subsequent partial collapse of the
building.
Rich Fitzharris, 52, is an electrical engineer
and a former residential contractor. He has
been the operations group chief of the Pentagon
Renovation Program Office since 1996. He was in
the Modular Office Compound at the time of the
crash and rushed to the site on foot, arriving
before the partial collapse. He recalls that
the building - near the area of impact - was in
flames, and he remembers seeing small pieces of
debris, the largest of which might have been
part of an engine shroud. He was at the
heliport when a portion of the structure
collapsed. The collapse initiated at the fifth
floor along the building expansion joint,
proceeded continuously and was completed within
a few seconds. According to the Arlington
County after-action report, this occurred at
9:57 a.m., or 19 minutes after impact.
3.7 SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT
The Boeing 757 approached the west wall of the
Pentagon from the southwest at approximately
780 ft/s.As it approached the Pentagon site it
was so low to the ground that it reportedly
clipped an antenna on a vehicle on an adjacent
road and severed light posts. When it was
approximately 320 ft from the west wall of the
building (0.42 second before impact), it was
flying nearly level, only a few feet above the
ground (figures 3.2 and 3.13, the latter an
aerial photograph modified graphically to show
the approaching aircraft). The aircraft flew
over the grassy area next to the Pentagon until
its right wing struck a piece of construction
equipment that was approximately 100 to 110 ft
from the face of the building (0.10 second
before impact (figure 3.14). At that time the
aircraft had rolled slightly to the left, its
right wing elevated.After the plane had
traveled approximately another 75 ft, the left
engine struck the ground at nearly the same
instant that the nose of the aircraft struck
the west wall of the Pentagon (figure 3.15).
Impact of the fuselage was at column line 14,
at or slightly below the secondfloor slab.The
left wing passed below the second-floor slab,
and the right wing crossed at a shallow angle
from below the second floor slab to above the
second-floor slab (figure 3.16)
A large fireball engulfed the exterior of the
building in the impact area. Interior fires
began immediately.
The impact upon the west facade removed
first-floor columns from column lines 10 to 14.
First-floor exterior columns on column lines 9,
15, 16, and 17 were severely damaged, perhaps
to the point of losing all capacity. The
secondfloor exterior column on column line 14
and its adjacent spandrel beams were destroyed
or seriously damaged. Additionally, there was
facade damage on both sides of the impact area,
including damage as high as the fourth floor.
However, in the area of the impact of the
fuselage and the tail, severe impact damage did
not extend above the third-floor slab.
Immediately upon impact, the Ring E structure
deflected downward over the region from an
expansion joint on column line 11 south to the
west exterior column on column line 18 (figures
3.8–3.10).The deformation was the most severe
at the expansion joint, where the deflection
was approximately 18 in. to 2 ft.
The structure was able to maintain this
deformed shape for approximately 20 minutes, at
which point all five levels of Ring E collapsed
from column line 11 to approximately column
line 18 (figure 3.12).
5. BPS SITE INSPECTIONS
Members of the BPS team inspected the site on
two occasions. Between September 14 and
September 21, 2001, team leader Paul Mlakar had
limited access to the site while rescue and
recovery operations were still in progress. On
this early inspection visit, he examined the
exterior of the building and portions of the
building interior.
Controlled access to the site was granted to
the full team after rescue and recovery
operations were complete. On October 4, 2001,
the Pentagon team, together with John Durrant,
the executive director of ASCE's institutes,
and W. Gene Corley, the BPS team leader at the
World Trade Center, inspected the interior and
exterior of the damaged area of the Pentagon
for approximately four hours.
The inspection of the BPS team focused on
obvious physical damage, primarily in the
region of the impact.This inspection was not
comprehensive. It did not address fire damage
to concrete as a material, and it did not
result in full documentation of all physical
damage or as-built construction.
***** By the time the full Pentagon BPS team
visited the site, all debris from the aircraft
and structural collapse had been removed
(figure 5.1) and shoring was in place wherever
there was severe structural damage. The design
team charged with reconstructing the Pentagon
was assessing the building and preparations
were being made to demolish the areas for
reconstruction. Consequently, the Pentagon BPS
team never had direct access to the structural
debris as it existed immediately after the
aircraft impact and subsequent fire. . . .
***** The aircraft had entered the building at
an angle, traveling in a northeasterly
direction. With the possible exception of the
immediate vicinity of the fuselage's entry
point at column line 14, essentially all
interior impact damage was inflicted in the
first story:The aircraft seems for the most
part to have slipped between the firstfloor
slab on grade and the second floor. The path of
damage extended from the west exterior wall of
the building in a northeasterly direction
completely through Ring E, Ring D, Ring C, and
their connecting lower floors.There was a hole
in the east wall of Ring C, emerging into AE
Drive, between column lines 5 and 7 in Wedge 2
(figure 5.16).The wall failure was
approximately 310 ft from where the fuselage of
the aircraft entered the west wall of the
building.The path of the aircraft debris passed
approximately 225 ft diagonally through Wedge 1
and approximately 85 ft diagonally through a
portion of Ring C in Wedge 2. . . .
***** Most of the serious structural damage was
within a swath that was approximately 75 to 80
ft wide and extended approximately 230 ft into
the first floor of the building.This swath was
oriented at approximately 35 to 40 degrees to
the perpendicular to the exterior wall of the
Pentagon.Within the swath of serious damage was
a narrower, tapering area that contained most
of the very severe structural damage. This
tapering area approximated a triangle in plan
and had a width of approximately 90 ft at the
aircraft's entry point and a length of
approximately 230 ft along the trajectory of
the aircraft through the building.
6. DISCUSSION
6.1 IMPACT DAMAGE
The site data indicate that the aircraft
fuselage impacted the building at column line
14 at an angle of approximately 42 degrees to
the normal to the face of the building, at or
slightly below the second- story slab.
Eyewitness accounts and photographs taken by a
security camera suggest that the aircraft was
flying on nearly a level path essentially at
grade level for several hundred feet
immediately prior to impact. Gashes in the
facade above the second-floor slab between
column lines 18 and 20 to the south of the
collapse area suggest that the aircraft had
rolled slightly to the left as it entered the
building.The right wing was below the
second-floor slab at the fuselage but above the
second-floor slab at the tip, and the left wing
struck the building entirely below the
second-floor slab, to the north of column line
14.
***** The width of the severe damage to the
west facade of the Pentagon was approximately
120 ft (from column lines 8 to 20).The
projected width, perpendicular to the path of
the aircraft, was approximately 90 ft, which is
substantially less than the 125 ft wingspan of
the aircraft (figure 6.1). An examination of
the area encompassed by extending the line of
travel of the aircraft to the face of the
building shows that there are no discrete marks
on the building corresponding to the positions
of the outer third of the right wing. The size
and position of the actual opening in the
facade of the building (from column line 8 to
column line 18) indicate that no portion of the
outer two-thirds of the right wing and no
portion of the outer one-third of the left wing
actually entered the building.
***** It is possible that less of the right
wing than the left wing entered the building
because the right wing struck the facade
crossing the level of the second-floor slab.The
strength of the second- floor slab in its own
plane would have severed the right wing
approximately at the location of the right
engine. The left wing did not encounter a slab,
so it penetrated more easily. In any event, the
evidence suggests that the tips of both wings
did not make direct contact with the facade of
the building and that portions of the wings
might have been separated from the fuselage
before the aircraft struck the building. This
is consistent with eyewitness statements that
the right wing struck a large generator before
the aircraft struck the building and that the
left engine struck a ground-level, external
vent structure. It is possible that these
impacts, which occurred not more than 100 ft
before the nose of the aircraft struck the
building, may have damaged the wings and caused
debris to strike the Pentagon facade and the
heliport control building.
The wing fuel tanks are located primarily
within the inner half of the wings.The center
of gravity of these tanks is approximately
one-third of the wing length from the fuselage.
Considering this tank position and the physical
evidence of the length of each wing that could
not have entered the building, it appears
likely that not more than half of the fuel in
the right wing could have entered the
building.While the full volume of the left wing
tank was within the portion of the wing that
might have entered the building, some of the
fuel from all tanks rebounded upon impact and
contributed to the fireball. Only a portion of
the fuel from the left and right wing tanks and
the center fuselage tank actually entered the
building.
The height of the damage to the facade of the
building was much less than the height of the
aircraft's tail. At approximately 45 ft, the
tail height was nearly as tall as the first
four floors of the building. Obvious visible
damage extended only over the lowest two
floors, to approximately 25 ft above grade.