by M. Shahid Alam
On January 31, 2008, when the Winograd Commission submitted its final report
on the Second Lebanese War of July 2006, this was a first in Israeli
history: a report on why the Israeli military had failed in a war.
The Winograd Commission offers a quite honest appraisal of some aspects of
the July 2006 War. It acknowledges that it was "a serious missed
opportunity." Israel had "initiated a long war, which ended with-out its
clear military victory (italics added)." The Commission notes that a militia
"of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the
Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology
advantages." Nothing could reverse Israel's handicaps: not even a massive
ground offensive launched in the last days of the war.
Yet, after this clear-headed assessment, the Commission stumbles. It blames
Israel's military setback on "serious failings and flaws" in
deci-sion-making, preparedness, coordination between the civilian and
mili-tary leadership, and strategic planning. In other words, the Israeli
mili-tary's poor showing in July 2006 was not the result of any fundamental
shift in the balance of forces. These failures were the result of a few bad
judgments, inadequate preparation and less-than-optimal coordination between
different branches of the Israeli military: all of them errors which can and
will be easily corrected in a rematch with the Hizbullah.
We cannot credibly blame the Israeli defeat on failures in decision-making.
Israel had many years to destroy the Hizbullah during its long occupation of
southern Lebanon; but it withdrew unilaterally in April 2000, with the
Hizbullah claiming victory. In July 2006 too, the Israeli military fell far
short of matching its earlier easy victories over Arab ar-mies: but this was
not because of failures of leadership, the failure to use sufficient
firepower (which it did), or the failure to launch a timely ground offensive
(it would get grounded the way it had before).
The Israeli military offensive of July 2006 had failed because Israel was
fighting a war that did not play to its advantages in size and tech-nology.
Israel had finally met its match - a foe that was prepared to fight, that
knew how to fight on its own terms, a foe that was elusive and cun-ning,
skilled and daring, ready to adapt its methods to neutralize Israel's
technical superiority, that controlled its terrain, and, most importantly,
was backed by Iran and Syria. For the first time in its history, an Israeli
invasion had been reversed by a cunning guerilla resistance.
In the past, Arab armies had handed easy victories to Israel. Repeat-edly,
the Arab states chose to fight conventional wars: these backward, recently
decolonized countries sent their poorly trained, poorly led, poorly
motivated military to fight against the best, most determined military force
the developed West could put together. Israel's victories against the Arab
armies is overrated: it always remained an unequal match. The Palestinians
chose to fight a guerilla war in Jordan in the late 1960s, but they did so
prematurely, without preparing the political con-ditions for their success.
They were defeated because they were forced to fight on two fronts: against
Arab enemy states and the Israelis.
The Israelis only deceive themselves when they use alibis - bad deci-sions
or inadequate preparation - to 'explain' their military failures. Ever since
their withdrawal from southern Lebanon in April 2000, the Israeli leadership
had prepared for the occasion to deal a knockout blow to Hizbullah. Indeed,
when the Israelis launched their latest invasion of Lebanon on July 12 2006,
they had had more than six years to prepare; and they had had more than two
decades to study their adversary.
The Hizbullah too had prepared. Without fanfare, but with dedica-tion,
discipline, skill, and cunning, the Hizbullah leaders assembled an arsenal
of low-tech rockets as well as more advanced missiles; they built secret
bunkers; they laid out defensible communications; they acquired capabilities
in electronic warfare; they used drones and eaves-dropping equipment to
gather information; they placed spies inside Israel; they studied their
enemy; and, most importantly, they had planned and trained, while
maintaining the highest secrecy. In a word, the small bands of Arab
guerillas in southern Lebanon were prepared and ready.
Israel executed its long-planned offensive against Hizbullah on July 12,
2006, using the excuse of a border skirmish to launch a full-scale and
devastating war against Lebanon. They launched massive air and artil-lery
strikes against Lebanon's civilian infrastructure - targeting Beirut and
sites as far north as the port city of Tripoli. Israeli ground forces
crossed the Lebanese border the same day, and continued to expand their
ground invasion in stages throughout the war. During the 33-day war, the
Israeli air force flew more than 15,000 sorties and struck 7000 targets in
Lebanon; the Israeli navy imposed a blockade on Lebanon, and bombed 2,500
Lebanese targets; and, all told, the Israelis destroyed 15,000 homes, 900
commercial buildings, 400 miles of roads, 80 bridges, and Lebanon's
international airport. Lebanon's human toll at the end of the war consisted
of 845 dead, including 743 civilians, 34 soldiers and 68 Hizbullah
guerillas. In addition, close to a million Lebanese were forced to flee
their homes. The intent of these genocidal attacks was to turn the Lebanese
against the Hizbullah. The Israelis failed in this objective too.
In all its wars against Arab armies, the Israelis had achieved clear
vic-tories within days. In 1956, they had captured nearly all of the Sinai
in about seven days. In June 1967, they crippled the Egyptian air force
within two hours: and the war against the three front-line Arab armies was
over in six days. In October war of 1973, the Israelis recovered from their
initial losses to cross the Suez Canal ten days after the start of the war,
and five days later they had encircled the Egyptian Third Army, a mere 40
miles from Cairo. On the Syrian front, the Israelis had advanced to within
ten miles of Damascus. Since 1973, Israel has many times vio-lated the
sovereignty of Arab states with impunity.
In contrast, Israel's full-scale war against Hizbullah's small guerilla
force of some 3000 fighters had lasted for 33 days, without giving the
Israelis the satisfaction of claiming victory. On July 12 2006, Israel had
started a full-scale war against Lebanon, convinced that it could destroy
Hizbullah or greatly diminish its military force within a few days - and do
it with air power alone. Israel's decision to end the war 33 days later,
even as Hizbullah kept up its barrage of Katyusha rockets into Israel, was a
dark chapter in Israel's military history. Israel's military might had been
neutralized by a seemingly Lilliputian adversary.
In July 2006, agility and cunning favored the Hizbullah. Consider the
victories that Israel failed to score against this tiny but agile foe: it
failed to destroy or jam Hizbullah's communications network; to knock out
Hizbullah's television and radio stations; to kill or capture Hassan
Nas-rallah; or to dent Hizbullah's ability to launch Katyusha rockets into
Is-rael. Hizbullah was firing Katyusha rockets at the rate of 100 a day
dur-ing July, doubled this rate in early August, and, in the last few hours
be-fore the ceasefire came into effect, fired 250 rockets. On the day of the
ceasefire, the Hizbullah still had 14,000 rockets in its arsenal, enough to
continue the war for another three months.
Contrary to Israeli denials, the daily barrage of Katyusha rockets took a
heavy toll on the Israeli economy. Altogether, a quarter of the 4000 rockets
Hizbullah launched during the war hit urban areas: they "para-lyzed the
whole of northern Israel, its main port, refineries, and many other
strategic installations. Over one million Israelis lived in bomb shel-ters
and about 300,000 temporarily left their homes and sought refuge in the
south." For a change, the Hizbullah had brought the war to Israel.
Moreover, the Hizbullah scored several clear victories over Israel's
military. According to an IDF Report Card published in the Jerusalem Post,
Israel had deployed some 400 Merkava MK-4 tanks - its safest and deadliest
tank - in Lebanon: 40 of these were hit by Hizbullah's anti-tank weapons, 20
of them were destroyed, and 30 tank crewmen were killed. According to a
report published by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
"Hizbullah's success with antitank weapons during the July War reflects many
years spent training on these weapons as well as a good plan to use these
weapons once the battle began."
Hizbullah's infantry or 'village units' - deployed along the border to slow
down the advance of Israeli ground forces - "made the IDF pay for every inch
of ground that it took. At the same time, crucially, Hizbullah dictated the
rules of how the war was to be fought." It is worth noting that the fighters
Hizbullah deployed in southern Lebanon were not its best. "One of the war's
ironies," Andrew Axum writes, "is that many of Hizballah's best and most
skilled fighters never saw action, lying in wait along the Litani River with
the expectation that the IDF assault would be much deeper and arrive much
faster than it did."
The Hizbullah scored its most impressive military victory in the area of
intelligence. Israel's electronic warfare systems are amongst the most
advanced in the world; they are war-tested and developed in coopera-tion
with the United States. Indeed, the Israeli commanders were certain at the
outset of the war of their ability to jam Hizbullah communications. They
were wrong. Hizbullah's command and control system remained operational
throughout the war; they evaded Israeli jamming devices by using fiber
optic lines instead of relying on wireless signals.
The Hizbullah had blocked the Barak anti-missile system on Israeli ships;
hacked into Israeli battlefield communications in order to monitor Israeli
tank movements; and, they monitored cell phone conversations in Hebrew
between Israeli reservists and their families. They intercepted Israeli
military communications on battlefield casualties and announced them on
their media network. They successfully employed decoys to hide the location
of hundreds of bunkers they had built in southern Lebanon to store weapons
and shelter their fighters. As a world leader in weapons technology and
communications, Israel had held a decisive ad-vantage in electronic warfare
in its wars with Arab armies. In July 2006, the Hizbullah had neutralized
Israel claims that it killed 400-500 Hizbullah fighters. Crooke and Perry
insist that these numbers are exaggerated. "It is impossible for Shi'ites
(and Hezbollah)," they argue, "not to allow an honorable burial for its
martyrs, so in this case it is simply a matter of counting funerals. Fewer
than 180 funerals have been held for Hezbollah fighters - nearly equal to
the number killed on the Israeli side."
The Israeli setbacks in the July War of 2006, then, represents a para-digm
shift - not something that can be pinned on careless errors in
deci-sion-making. Unlike the Arab armies in the past, the Hizbullah had
fought a people's war. It neutralized Israel's technological superiority by
deploying its mobile, elusive, disciplined and skilled guerilla detach-ments
- not a centralized, conventional army - to fight the Israelis.
The Hizbullah fights in small groups, it is evasive, it is secretive, it
owns its terrain, it trains, it has high morale, and it enjoys complete
popular support amongst Lebanon's Shi'ites. It can launch thousands of
low-tech rockets which rendered sophisticated anti-missile defenses
use-less. It has also acquired and learned to use with great effectiveness
anti-tank missiles that make Israel's most advanced tanks vulnerable. They
have successfully targeted even Israeli warships.
If the Hizbullah can extend these advantages, if it can add shoulder-fired
anti-aircraft missiles to its arsenal and bring down a few Israeli
helicopters and jets, Israel could quickly lose its unchallenged control
over Lebanese skies. Israel's daily and wanton violations of Lebanese
airspace would also come to an end.
The Hizbullah offers Israel a new kind of asymmetric warfare: it combines
low-tech guerilla tactics with sophisticated missile and com-munications
technology. Understandably, the Israelis find these Hizbul-lah achievements
hard to digest. What the world witnessed in Lebanon in July 2006 were events
that contain the potential for shifting the bal-ance of power in the Middle
East. Earlier, the Iraqi insurgents had dem-onstrated that they can make an
occupation - even by the world's great-est power - very costly. Now, the
Hizbullah had shown that a disci-plined guerilla force, with access to
advanced missiles, can repel the most powerful invading army.
It appears that the weapons gap that had opened up in recent dec-ades
between Western powers and the weaker, technologically back-ward nations may
be closing. How rapidly this happens will depend on the willingness of
Russia, China, North Korea, Iran - with other coun-tries getting ready to
join them - to make these weapons available to movements of resistance.
Alternatively, if these countries hesitate, the arms smugglers will step in
to provide this service. Once anti-tank, anti-ship and shoulder-fired
anti-aircraft missiles can be bought on the world's illicit arms markets as
readily as AK-47s, this will begin to alter the fortunes of resistance
movements battling great powers.
In the late nineteenth century, the advanced Western nations had opened a
lethal weapons gap with their automatic weapons: this gave them a quick,
nearly costless colonization of Africa and Southeast Asia. When that gap
began to close in the interwar period, it gave an impetus to resistance
movements in Indonesia, Vietnam, Kenya and Algeria. Al-ready weakened from
fighting their own fratricidal wars, the Western colonial powers retreated:
and the Third World was born.
Will the twenty-first century herald the dawn of another era of gains for
movements of resistance across Asia, Africa and Latin America?
M. Shahid Alam is professor of economics at Northeastern University, Boston.
He is the author most recently of Challenging the New Orientalism (IPI:
2007). You may email him at firstname.lastname@example.org.
Sam F. Ghattas, "Israel Intensifies
Attacks Against Lebanon," Associated Press, July 13, 2006
"Israeli War Crimes in
Lebanon," Human Rights Watch, August 3, 2006