[Every piece of evidence I came across in my own work contradicted
this notion of al-Qaeda as an "Evil Empire" with an omnipotent
mastermind at its head. Such an idea was undoubtedly comforting -
destroy the man and his henchmen and the problem goes away - but it
was clearly deeply flawed. As a result the debate over the
prosecution of the ongoing "war on terror" had been skewed.
Instead of there being a reasoned and honest look at the root causes
of resurgent Islamic radicalism the discussion of strategies in the
war against terror had been almost entirely dominated by the
language of high-tech weaponry, militarism and eradication.
One question remained, and remains, largely unanswered: what is
al-Qaeda? The word itself is critical. Al-Qaeda comes from the
Arabic root qaf-ayn-dal. It can mean a base, such as a camp or a
home, or a foundation. It can also mean a precept, rule, principle,
maxim, formula or method. . . .
Abdullah Azzam, the chief ideologue of the non-Afghan militants and
a spiritual mentor of bin Laden] was talking about a mode of
activism and a tactic, not talking about a particular organisation.
Indeed it would be a year or more before bin Laden formed his group.
Azzam was using the word to denote a purpose, an ideal and a
function. He, and subsequently bin Laden too, saw the role of
al-Qaeda, the vanguard, as being to radicalise and mobilise those
Muslims who had hitherto rejected their extremist message. . . .
Bin Laden's group was formed with the aim of rousing Muslims,
through active campaigning or "propaganda by deed", to create an
"international army" that would unite the umma or world Islamic
community against oppression. The group was small, comprising not
more than a dozen men, and there was little to distinguish it from
the scores of other groups operating, forming and dissolving in
Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Islamic world.
. . . claims of any links between Saddam and al-Qaeda were based on
a fundamental misconception of the nature of modern Islamic
militancy.
. . . This ideology, a composite of the common elements of all the
various strands of modern Islamic radical thought, is currently the
most widespread, and the fastest growing, element of what makes up
the phenomenon currently, and largely erroneously, labelled
"al-Qaeda". . . .
In the weeks immediately following the tragedy of September 11th
there was a genuine interest in understanding: why?. Why "they" hate
us, why "they" were prepared to kill themselves, why such a thing
could happen. That curiosity has dwindled and is being replaced by
other questions: how did it happen, how many of "them" are there,
how many are there left to capture and kill. Anyone who tries to
"explain" the roots of the threat now facing all of us, to answer
the "why", to elaborate who "they are", risks being dismissed as
ineffectual or cowardly. To ask "why" is to lay oneself open to
accusations of lacking the moral courage to face up to the "genuine"
threat and the need to meet it with force and aggression. Many
characterise this threat, dangerously and wrongly, as rooted in a
"clash of civilizations."--Jason Burke, "Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror," Guardian, July 13, 2003]
[Al-Qaeda is not a traditional terrorist organisation. It does not
have a clear hierarchy, military mindset and centralised command. At
best, Al-Qaeda is a network of affiliated groups sharing religious
and ideological backgrounds, but which often interact sparingly.
Al-Qaeda is a state of mind, as much as an organisation; it
encompasses a wide range of members and followers who can differ
dramatically from each other.--Dr Andrew Silke, "Profiling terror," Janes, August 7, 2003]
Maureen Dowd, "The Bush team has now created
the very monster that it conjured up to alarm Americans into backing
a war on Iraq," New York Times, August 20, 2003
Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Brothels
and bombs in Saudi Arabia," Asia Times Online, December 9, 2003
[Al-Qaeda is not a terrorist group; it's an insurgency that is
extraordinarily well structured in terms of succession for leadership.--"Q&A with 'Anonymous'," USA Today, July 18, 2004]
Pascal Riche, "Al-Qaeda,
a Social Movement, but not a Hierarchical Group," Liberation, August
17, 2004
VIDEO Part
1, Part
2, Part
3: Adam Curtis, "The Power of Nightmares," BBC2, October 20, 2004
[Since September 11 Britain has been warned of the 'inevitability' of
catastrophic terrorist attack. But has the danger been exaggerated? A major
new TV documentary claims that the perceived threat is a politically driven
fantasy - and al-Qaida a dark illusion.--Andy Beckett, "The
making of the terror myth," Guardian, October 15, 2004]
["The Power of Nightmares: The Rise of the Politics of Fear," a three-hour
historical film by Adam Curtis recently aired by the British Broadcasting
Corp., argues coherently that much of what we have been told about the
threat of international terrorism "is a fantasy that has been exaggerated
and distorted by politicians. . . .
But the film . . . directly challenges the conventional wisdom by making a
powerful case that the Bush administration, led by a tight-knit cabal of
Machiavellian neoconservatives, has seized upon the false image of a unified
international terrorist threat to replace the expired Soviet empire in order
to push a political agenda. --Robert Scheer, "Is Al Qaeda Just a Bush Boogeyman?," Los Angeles Times, January
11, 2005]
[In a new series, the Power of Nightmares explores how the idea that we are
threatened by a hidden and organised terrorist network is an illusion.
It is a myth that has spread unquestioned through politics, the security
services and the international media.--"The Power of
Nightmares," BBC News, January 14, 2005]
"Secret
FBI Report Questions Al Qaeda Capabilities: No 'True' Al Qaeda Sleeper Agents
Have Been Found in U.S.," ABC News, March 9, 2004
Matthew Parris, "I name
the four powers who are behind the al-Qaeda conspiracy," Times, July 23,
2005
Adam Curtis, "Creating
Islamist phantoms: We dreamed up 'al-Qaida'. Let's not do it again with
'evil ideology'," Guardian, August 30, 2005
[Al-Qaeda is not only attempting to destabilise the western world, but the
whole of the stagnated Middle East.--Abdel Bari Atwan, "Total
war: Inside the new Al-Qaeda," Sunday Times, February 26, 2006]
Craig Whitlock, "Architect of New War on the West: Writings Lay Out
Post-9/11 Strategy of Isolated Cells Joined in Jihad," Washington
Post, May 23, 2006
Enver Masud, "FBI: Bin Laden Not
Wanted for 9/11," The Wisdom Fund, June 8, 2006
[The reality, as we have learned since . . . is that al-Libi made up that
story of Iraq connections, probably because he was tortured by the Egyptians
(or possibly Libyan intelligence officers who worked with them). But there's
even more to this strange tale that hasn't been revealed. According to Numan
bin-Uthman, a former fellow jihadi of al-Libi's who has left the movement
and is based in London, al-Libi was never a member of Al Qaeda at
all.--Michael Hirsh, "The Myth of Al
Qaeda: Before 9/11, Osama bin Laden's group was small and fractious. How
Washington helped to build into a global threat," Newsweek, June 28, 2006]
Robert Dreyfuss, "There Is No War on Terror," tompaine.com, September 13, 2006
